Abdul Haris Nasution born in Kotanopan, North Sumatra onand died in Jakarta onis an Indonesian military man who twice held the position of Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army . He was the only one of the seven generals to escape an abduction during what the Soeharto regime dubbed the ” September 30 Movement .”


Nasution was born on the island of Sumatra on, a farmer father, active in Sarekat Islam . Evoking memories of his childhood, recalls Nasution quickly acquired a taste for reading 1 .

At the end of high school ref.  desired] in 1935 , Nasution originally thought to move towards a teaching career. Graduated from a school of education in 1938 , he worked several times as a teacher in Bengkulu and Palembang . In 1942 , he turned to a military career by entering a military academy ref.  desired] the Dutch colonial government in Bandung , West Java . Shortly after Japaninvaded and occupied Indonesia. During this period, Nasution remained in Bandung and held a civil servant position.

Struggle for the independence of Indonesia

Commander of the Siliwangi Division

After the declaration of independence of Soekarno and Hatta the, Nasution joined the fledgling Tentara Keamanan Rakyat or ” popular army security ” (TKR) and was given the regional command of the Siliwangi Division, responsible for security in West Java in.

In this post, Nasution developed the theory of what would later become the defense doctrine of the Indonesian army 2 , 3 .

In the Indonesian and Dutch governments sign the Renville agreement . By this agreement, the Indonesians recognize that the territories occupied by the Dutch troops belong to the Netherlands [citation needed] . As West Java is part of these territories, Nasution is forced to move the Siliwangi Division to Central Java .

Deputy Commander General Sudirman

The year 1948 will also see Nasution be promoted to deputy commander of the People’s Security Army. Despite his rank of colonel , this appointment made Nasution the most powerful character of the TKR, just behind his commander-in-chief, the popular General Sudirman . In April, he assisted the latter in the structural reorganization of the troops. In June, at a meeting of the commanders, his suggestion to adopt guerrilla tactics against the Dutch was approved.

Although he was not the commander of the TKR, Nasution gained experience on the tasks of during the Madiun affair . During the year, former Prime Minister Amir Sjarifuddin aligned himself with Musso of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

When news of the incident reached the TKR headquarters in Yogyakarta , then the capital of the Republic, the high-ranking officers met. Sudirman was eager to avoid violence and wanted negotiations to be conducted. Sudirman then charged a certain lieutenant-colonel Soeharto to negotiate an agreement with the Communists. After going on the spot, Soeharto returned to Nasution and Sudirman and reported that everything seemed peaceful. Nasution did not believe the report and Sudirman is suffering, it is he who was given command 4 . Nasution then chooses the repression, sending troops to pursue the communists and suppress the uprising.

The Madiun was taken over by the Republican troops of the Siliwangi division . Thousands of party cadres were executed and 36,000 members were imprisoned. Among those executed, several leaders including Musso , killed on, allegedly while trying to escape from prison. Other PKI leaders like DN Aidit went into exile in China.

The the Dutch launched a victorious attack on Yogyakarta and occupied it. Nasution, along with other Commanders and their troops, retreated into the countryside to carry out guerrilla tactics. President Soekarno and Vice President Mohammad Hatta captured by the Dutch, an “Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia” ( Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia or PDRI) was established in Sumatra . In this interim government, Nasution served as the military and territorial commander of Java.

Despite the critical situation of 1948 , the general offensive ofled by Sultan Hamengkubuwana IX incited the soldiers to continue the resistance throughout Indonesia ref.  desired] and urged the United Nations to put pressure on the Netherlands so that they recognize Indonesian independence. The Dutch troops finally stopped the fight in July and in December the authorities recognized the independence of Indonesia. When the IRDP handed over his powers to Soekarno and Hatta, Nasution resumed his position as Deputy Commander in Sudirman.

st position of Chief of Staff of the Army and the Case of 17 October

In 1950, Nasution was appointed Army Chief of Staff, along with TB Simatupang, replacing Sudirman, and Commander ABRI, Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia , newly formed.

In 1952, Nasution and Simatupang decided to carry out a restructuring and reorganization of the ABRI. Under this policy, Nasution and Simatupang hoped to create a numerically smaller army, but an army which expected it to be more modern and professional 5 . But the cleavage of interests did not take long to appear. Nasution and Simatupang, both of whom had been trained by the Dutch colonial government, wanted to send Japanese-trained soldiers back and integrate more soldiers from the same sector. Troops who had been trained by the Japanese, led by Bambang Supeno, began to protest against this policy.

In the implementation of this policy, Nasution and Simatupang had the support of Prime Minister Wilopo and Defense Minister Hamengkubuwono IX . However, Supeno worked to gain support among opposition party members of the People’s Representative Council (DPR). DPR members began to express their disagreement over the restructuring of the ABRI. Nasution and Simatupang were unhappy to witness what they saw as civilian interference in military affairs.

The Nasution and Simatupang mobilized their troops in a demonstration of strength. Protestant against a civil intervention in military affairs, the troops of Nasution and Simatupang surrounded the presidential palace, the turrets of their tanks pointed towards it. They asked Soekarno to dissolve the DPR. For this demonstration, Nasution and Simatupang also mobilized civil protesters. Soekarno left the Presidential Palace and, using only his famous oratorical skills, managed to convince both soldiers and civilians to return. It was the defeat of Nasution and Simatupang.

Nasution and Simatupang were later questioned by the Attorney General ref.  desired] Suprapto. In December 1952 they both lost their positions in the ABRI and were removed from the army.

Principles of Guerrilla

During the period when he was not the chief of personnel of the army, Nasution wrote a book titled Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare (Principles of guerrilla warfare). This book is based on Nasution’s personal experience of fighting and guerrilla organization during the Indonesian War of Independence. Originally published in 1953, it will become one of the most studied books on guerrilla tactics with Mao Zedong’s work on the same subject.

e post of Chief of the Army and amplification of the military power

The After three years in exile, Nasution was again appointed to the position of Chief of Staff of the Army which he had previously held.

Nasution immediately began his work on the military structure by adopting a three-pronged approach 6 .Its first step was to establish a system service tower. In this way the officers could be stationed anywhere in the country and gain experience. This approach was also intended to train more professional officers and reduce their sense of personal attachment to their region or province of origin. The second measure of Nasution was to centralize military training. All training methods for recruits had to be uniform rather than left to the discretion of regional commanders. The third and most important step was to increase the influence and power of the army, which could then self-manage and no longer depend on decisions made by civilians. Nasution had no problem to apply the first two measures,
In 1957, President Soekarno began to introduce the concept of ” directed democracy ” into his rhetoric, in response to his disenchantment with the ” liberal democracy ” that Indonesia had adopted since November 1945. In this respect, he found a point of agreement with Nasution and the army, who had not forgotten the interference, in 1952, of the parliament in what they considered to be “the affairs of the army”. The, after receiving the resignation of Prime Minister Ali Sastroadmijojo and his government, Soekarno declared a state of emergency .

Not only did this gesture mark the end of the limit to the ceremonial role assigned to the presidential office, but it also increased the influence and power of the army, responding to Nasution’s hopes. Under the agreement, the regional commanders acquired the power to interfere in civil cases, such as economics and administrative matters 7 . Under the command of Soekarno himself, the army also began to take on a political role, with some of its members occupying positions of ministers in the government, provincial governors and even representatives of the DPR.. In December 1957, Nasution went further and increased the role of the Army by ordering the officers to seize the newly nationalized Dutch companies. In addition to increasing the role of the army, this action was also planned to stop the influence of the growing power of the PKI.

In 1958, Nasution delivered a famous speech that would become the basis of the “Dwinfugsi” doctrine adopted during the Soeharto era by ABRI. Speaking in Magelang , Central Java , Nasution said ABRI should take a middle path in its approach to the nation. According to Nasution, the ABRI should not be under the control of civilians. At the same time it should not dominate the nation, so that the system becomes a military dictatorship 8 .

The rebellion of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia ( PRRI )

In late 1956, Sumatra Regional Commanders demanded more autonomy in the provinces. Faced with the central government’s refusal to grant their demands ref.  required] , they rose and early 1957, they had forcibly taken control of the government in Sumatra. The, Lieutenant-Colonel Ahmad Hussein proclaims the establishment of the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia or PRRI, pushing the central government of Jakarta to deploy troops.

As Chief of Staff, Nasution will be involved in mobilizing resources to Sumatra. However, it will be his deputy second, Colonel Ahmad Yani who will be famous in the battle of the insurgents.

Back to the 1945 Constitution

The Soekarno promulgated a decree stipulating that Indonesia would again be governed by the 1945 constitution. The system of liberal democracy was to disappear, with Soekarno becoming head of governmentwhile retaining the role of head of state . Nasution was appointed Minister of Defense and Security in the government of Soekarno, remaining nevertheless Chief of Staff of the army.

Era of the “Directed Democracy”

To corruption in the Army

Since 1956, Nasution was trying to curb corruption within the Army. But the return to the 1945 Constitution seemed to have renewed its determination on this subject. According to him, the Army should be an example for the rest of society. Shortly after the decree ofNasution sent Brigadier General Sungkono to investigate the financial shenanigans of Kodam IV / Diponegoro and his commander, Colonel Soeharto.

The results obtained by Sungkono revealed that, during his assignment as Regional Commander, Soeharto had set up foundations to assist local residents. However, these foundations were financed by levies (instead of donations) from the production and service industries. Soeharto was also involved in illegal barter. He had notably traded sugar for rice with Thailand .

Nasution wanted to take action against Soeharto and actually considered his expulsion from the Army. However, Gatot Subroto, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army intervened 9 . Gatot had taken Soeharto under his wing when he was commander of Kodam IV / Diponegoro and had noticed his talents. Gatot asked Nasution not to expel Soeharto because his talents were of those that could be used later. Nasution followed Gatot’s advice. He merely relieved him of his command and punished him by sending him to the military school of the Army Staff ( Sekolah Staf Komando Angkatan Darat or SESKOAD).

The West New Guinea

During the struggle for independence, Soekarno has always considered Western New Guinea , which he called “Irian”, an integral part of Indonesia. When the Netherlands finally recognized Indonesia’s independence, Western New Guinea remained a Dutch colony. Soekarno did not admit defeat and continued to press, especially at the United Nations and at the Bandung Conferencewhere the present nations pledged to support Indonesia’s demand for this entity to be politically attached to Indonesia. The Dutch continued to show influx. In 1960, Soekarno lost patience. In July he gathered his closest advisers, including Nasution, and it was decided that Indonesia would face the Netherlands over sovereignty over Western New Guinea.

During the preparation of this campaign, Nasution turns to Soeharto, who , finishes his training at Seskoad. Soeharto, then Brigadier General , was charged by Nasution with creating a strategic force, which would stand in reserve, standing ready to be called at all times. Soeharto was placed in charge of this taskforce andA “general reserve army” ( Cadangan Umum Angkatan Darat or CADUAD) was created, and appointed Soeharto headed 10 . In 1963, CADUAD changed its name to Kostrad ( Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat or “command of strategic reserves of the army”).

In early 1962, Nasution and Yani were the supreme commanders of the so-called Liberation of Western Irian, with Soharto stationed in East Indonesia, as Commander on the ground.

Rivalry with the PKI and division with Yani

At this time, Soekarno began to see the PKI, and no longer the army, as his main political ally. Although he secured Indonesia nonaligned position during the Cold War , the support provided by the United States at the insurrection of PRRI encouraged Sukarno to adopt a position anti-American . Thus, he found near the PKI a natural ally. For the PKI, an alliance with Soekarno was only a supplement to their political dynamics since their influence continued to increase in Indonesian politics. InSoekarno formed a new government. The leader of the PKI, DN Aidit and Vice President Njoto were appointed Ministers.

Nasution was wary of the influence of the PKI on Soekarno and in return, Soekarno knew that Nasution did not appreciate the influence of the PKI and was acting in such a way as to weaken his power. InSoekarno reorganized the structure of ABRI. The status of the leaders of the armed forces would then be reassessed from “Chief of Staff” to “Commander”. As “commanders”, the leaders of the armed forces would have more power and would report solely to Soekarno as supreme commander of the ABRI. To assist Soekarno in this function, there would be a chief of staff of ABRI. Soekarno D2SIGNA Nased to this post 11 and appointed Yani as Commander of the Army. In doing so, Soekarno reduced the Nasution powers because the ABRI Chief of Staff was only responsible for administrative matters and had no authority over the management of the troops.

Now without powers, Nasution began to think of other ways to stop the progression of the PKI. The right moment came in, at the General Session of the People ‘s Assembly (MPRS). During the plenary session, Nasution had the Indonesian National Party (PNI) Sukarno, as the presence of members of the military to support the motion be established Life President 12 . The underlying reasoning was that Soekarno became President for life, there would be no more elections, and without elections, the PKI could not take power, regardless of the influence it would manage to take in the future. The motion was passed and Soekarno became President for life.

Nasution quickly began to show hostility toward Yani. Nasution and Yani were both anti-communists. But their attitude to Soekarno was different. Nasution was critical of Soekarno’s support for the PKI. While Yani, a “loyalist” took a more moderate stance. Nasution criticized Yani’s attitude and the agreement between the two officers ceased. To further aggravate the problem, Yani began to replace some Regional Commanders close to Nasution with others of his choice.

The a delegation of officers representing Nasution and Yani met for an attempt at reconciliation between the two officers. The meeting did not succeed in his attempt to dismiss Yani from Soekarno. But they agreed to hold meetings during which the military could discuss the political climate and the role of the Army in politics.

As the year progressed, a curious document was discovered. called Gilchrist Document. He mentions in particular “our local military friends”, and the suspicion immediately turned to the army to attempt a coup d’etat. Although Yani was quick to deny these allegations, the PKI launched a smear campaign, claiming that the council of generals planned to overthrow the president. As the oldest officers of the Army, Nasution and Yani were involved as having participated in this plot.

G30S and transition to the New Order

Attempt to kidnap

Missed opportunity

Although Soeharto was the man of the hour the st of October, many other Army officers continued to submit to the authority of Nasution and had actually hoped he would take control of the situation. However, Nasution seemed undecided and slowly but surely the support began to stand out.

Perhaps the reason was that he was rightly still deeply saddened for his daughter, Ade Irma, who died on .

In the first weeks after the G30S, Nasution was the one who put constant pressure on Soekarno so that Soeharto was appointed Commander of the Army ref.  desired] . Soekarno, who after the wanted to keep Pranoto, initially named Soeharto simply Commander of Kopkamtib, but as a result of constant pressure from Nasution, he was finally convinced and , named Soeharto Commander of the Army.

A golden opportunity presented itself to Nasution in in discussions evoking his appointment to the vice presidency to assist Sukarno in troubled times 13 . Nasution did not take advantage of it and chose to do nothing. Soeharto, whose political ascendancy was growing, took the initiative in early 1966 stating that nothing required to assign the vice-presidency remained vacant.

The Nasution lost his position as Minister of Defense and Security during a cabinet reorganization. The position of Chief of Staff of ABRI was also removed.

At this point, hopes of seeing Nasution do something had died out, as Army officers and student movements rallied to Suharto. Nevertheless, he continued to be a respected figure as many officers visited him in the days leading up to the Supersemar . In fact, while Soeharto was about to go to the Kostrad headquarters to await the delivery of the Supersemar, he called Nasution to ask for his blessing. His wife did so on behalf of her absent husband.

The political sense of Nasution seems to have returned to him after Soeharto received the Supersemar. He was probably the first to realize that the Supersemar not only gave Suharto the powers of eception, but also granted him executive control. TheAfter Suharto had banned the PKI, Nasution suggested he form a government emergency 14 . Soeharto, still cautious about what he could or could not do with his new powers, replied that the formation of the government was the responsibility of the President. Nasution encouraged Soeharto, promising him his absolute support. But Soeharto did not answer and the conversation ended abruptly.

President of the MPRS

With his new powers, Soeharto began to purge the government of what he perceived to be communist influence. After the arrest of 15 cabinet ministersSuharto worried about the MPRS, excluding members considered as communist sympathizers and replacing them with other members closer to the military cause. During purging, LMSAR also lost its president, Chaerul Saleh  (in) and there was no need to replace the vacancy.

Nasution was chosen by an overwhelming majority from all factions of the MPRS, as candidate for the post of President of this assembly. However, he waited for Soeharto to support his appointment before accepting it.

The , the plenary session of the 1966 MPRS opened. Nasution fixed the Supersemar as a priority on the agenda list by entering the Assembly Hall with the authentic version of the document. The next day, the, the MPRS ratified the Supersemar, making its repeal by Soekarno illegal. TheSoekarno gave a speech to the assembly entitled Nawaksara (nine points).


Portion of English text to translate into French

The MPRS had to refuse to ratify this speech.

For the next two weeks, Nasution presided over a plenary session of the very active MPRS. Under his leadership, the MPRS took measures such as the ban on Marxism-Leninism , the abrogation of Soekarno’s Life Presidency, and ordered that parliamentary elections be held in July 1968. The MPRS also increased the powers held by Soeharto in officially enjoining him to form a new government. A constitutional amendment was also adopted stipulating that if the President was unable to fulfill his duties, he would be replaced by the holder of the Supersemar and not by the Vice-President.

In the course of 1966, Sukarno was more and more on the defensive and its popularity at its lowest level. Soeharto, knowing the near political victory, played the part of the polished Javanese, constantly holding reassuring words and defending him against his detractors. Other generals such as Nasution were not so indulgent; Towards the end of the year, Nasution declared that Soekarno should be held responsible for the sinister situation in which the government had left Indonesia. Nasution also demanded that Soekarno be sued.

The Nasution and the MPRS met again as Soekarno submitted his report (although he did not give a face-to-face lecture) which he hoped would eventually evoke the G30S issue. Title Supplementary Nawaksara, the report mentioned the inststance Soekarno calling the G30S movement of st October (Gestok). About the G30S, Sukarno said the PKI made a big mistake the morning ofbut added also that the events were due to the deviousness of the neo-colonialists . In a subtle spade to Nasution, Soekarno added that if he was to be blamed for the G30S, the Minister of Defense and Security at the time should be blamed for not having seen the G30S happen, nor able to stop it before it happens 15 . The report was again rejected by the MPRS.

In , the DPR convened a special session of the MPRS to remove Sukarno from the presidency in favor of Suharto. Soekarno seemed resigned to his fate, officially transferring government control of current affairs to Soeharto onand asking him to refer to him only in case of necessity. Finally theSoekarno was officially removed from power by the MPRS. Nasution received the oath of office from Soeharto as president in office.

One year later, Nasution presided over the election of Soeharto and his inauguration as official president.

During the New Order

Deterioration of Soeharto and Fall Relationships

Despite Nasution’s help in ascending to power, Soeharto perceived him as a rival and immediately began to work toward his removal. In 1969 , Nasution was forbidden to speak to Seskoad and AKABRI ref.  desired] 16 . In 1971 , Nasution was suddenly relieved of his service obligations, at the age of 53, and two years before the expected age of retirement, 55 years. Nasution also lost his seat as President of the MPR, in 1972 , replaced by Idham Chalid  (in) , elected by representatives from the Legislative 1971 .

The sudden fall of Nasution was given the nickname of Gelandangan Politik (Political Clochardization).

Opposition to the Regime of the New Order

Once removed from power, Nasution became a political opponent of the New Order regime.

By the end of the 1970s, Suharto’s regime had changed from being popular to authoritarian and corrupt. Many voices began to rise and criticize the regime. After the parliamentary elections of 1977, suspected of being the subject of electoral fraud by the Golkar party of Suharto, Nasution declared that there was a crisis in the direction of the new Order.

In In the company of former Vice President Hatta , Nasution founded the Yayasan Lembaga Kesadaran Berkonstitusi or (YLKB) Institute for Constitutional Conscience . The government reacts quickly and bans the first meeting of the organization in. Nasution and the YLKB did not give up andarranged for a rally in which members of the DPR were admitted. Significantly, members of ABRI attended the meeting. During this, Nasution criticized the New Order, accusing it of not applying totalementni the Pancasila or the 1945 Constitution 17 . Suharto did not take criticism lightly. On 27 March 1980, at a meeting of the ABRI, Suhrto stated that the members of the ABRI should stand ready to defend their headquarters at the DPR and that they themselves should align themselves with the forces favorable to Pancasila and the 1945 constitution, like the Golkar. He persevered on this point in a new speech on April 16, 1980, on the occasion of a birthday of Kopassus. Suharto and the accusations of corruption and said that if he was forced to, he would kidnap members of the MPR if it would prevent the two-thirds majority required to amend the constitution.

Nasution then decided that opposition to the regime should be a strong gesture. He gathered the ABRI elements dissatisfied with the Soeharto regime as the former governor of Jakarta , Ali Sadikin  (in) , the former police chief, Hugeng Imam Santoso , and former Vice Chief of Staff of the Yasin Army . Former Prime Minister Mohammed Natsir  (in) and Burhanuddin Harahap as the leader of the IRDP Syarifuddin Prawiranegara joined them. Accompanied by many other big names in government criticism, they signed a petition that was to be known as Petisi 50 (the petition of the fifty ). So named because it had fifty signatories.

The petition was signed on  and handed over to the DPR on . She called on Soeharto to stop interpreting Pancasila to achieve her ends and ABRI to remain neutral and not to favor Golkar . The DPR, particularly the members of Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) and those of Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, took the petition seriously and asked Suhrto to deal with it. Soeharto replied in his speeches and were a sufficient answer. Suharto added that in the event of any problem, the DPR could table a motion for a special inquiry. The members of the PPP and the PDI stood there, knowing that their motion would be defeated by Golkar’s rule. For the petitioners of the petition, such as Nasution, Soeharto imposed travel bans, and made their business more difficult, so that the living conditions of the signatories of the petition become painful.


Bust of Nasution at the Museum Jenderal Besar DR. Abdul Haris Nasution .

In the early 1990s, Soeharto began adopting a policy of openness and retaliatory measures against Petisi 50 signatories relaxed. InDuring a hospital stay, he was visited by dignitaries of the army. Nasution was visited by BJ Habibie , then Minister of Technology of Soeharto. Habibie then invited Nasution and the other signatories to visit the shipyard and the aeronautical factory under his supervision. The government also claimed that although a travel ban was applied to the petitioners of the 50 petition, these restrictions did not apply to Nasution. For its part, Nasution denied criticizing the government, preferring to speak of “difference of opinion”.

Finally, in Soeharto invited Nasution to the Presidential Palace for a meeting. This was followed by another meeting onafter the celebration of the anniversary of the independence of the country 18. There was no talk of politics, but it was clear that the two men wanted to reconcile their differences. In a 1995 interview, Nasution encouraged Indonesia to follow a reconciliation process to unite the nation under Soeharto’s command.

The On the occasion of the anniversary of ABRI, Nasution was issued with the honorary rank of Jenderal Besar  (in) , a distinction he shares only with Suharto and Sudirman.





  • Authority Records : Virtual International Authority File • International Standard Name Identifier • University Documentation System • Library of Congress • Gemeinsame Normdatei •Royal Library of the Netherlands • WorldCat
  • Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare. New York: Praeger, 1965
  • CLM Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution: a political biography (St. Lucia, New York: University of Queensland Press, 1985)

Notes and references

  1. ↑ ( id ) ” Abdul Haris Nasution ”  [ archive ] , Tempo (accessedNovember 4, 2006 )
  2. ↑ ( in ) Robert Cribb, ” Military strategy in the Indonesian revolution: Nasution’s concept of” Total People’s War “in theory and practice ” , War & Society , o 19, no. 2p.  143-154
  3. ↑ ( id ) ” Abdul Haris Nasution ”  [ archive ] , Tempo (accessedNovember 4th, 2006 )
  4. ↑ ( in ) ( in ) Robert Elson , Suharto: A Political Biography , The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, ( ISBN  978-0-521-77326-3 ) , p.  26
  5. ↑ ( id ) Bambang Sujatmoko, ” dwifungsi Di Tiga Zaman ”  [ archive ] , Gatra, (accessed February 11, 2008 )
  6. ↑ ( in ) ( in ) Robert Elson, Suharto: A Political Biography , The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, ( ISBN  0-521-77326-1 ) , p.  57-58
  7. ↑ ( in ) ( in ) Robert Elson, Suharto: A Political Biography , The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, ( ISBN  0-521-77326-1 ) , p.  61
  8. ↑ ( id ) Priyono B. Sumbogo, ” Jalan Tengah ”  [ archive ] , Gatra, (accessed November 4, 2006 )
  9. ↑ ( in ) ( in ) Robert Elson, Suharto: A Political Biography , The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, ( ISBN  978-0-521-77326-3 ) , p.  73
  10. ↑ ( in ) ( in ) Robert Elson, Suharto: A Political Biography , The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, ( ISBN  0-521-77326-1 ) , p.  79
  11. ↑ ( id ) Christianto Wibisono, ” Hentikan” Bharata Yuda “2004 ”  [ archive] , Suara Pembaruan, (accessed November 4, 2006 )
  12. ↑ ( id ) Sumaun Utomo, ” Fakta Kebenaran Korban Tragedi Peristiwa 65 [ archive ] , Official Site A. Umar Said (accessed November 4, 2006 )
  13. ↑ ( in ) John Hughes, The End of Sukarno: A Blow That Misfired: A Purge That Ran Wild , Singapore, Archipelago Press,reprinted 2002) ( ISBN 981-4068-65-9 ) , p.  215
    3rd edition
  14. ↑ ( id ) Sulangkung Suwalu, ” Peran Nasution Dalam Soeharto Antar Ke Puncak Kekuasaan ”  [ archive ] , munindo.brd.de, (accessedNovember 4, 2006 )
  15. ↑ ( id ) ” Nawaksara Supplementary Transcript ”  [ archive ] , Tempo, (accessed November 4, 2006 )
  16. ↑ ( id ) Julius For, ” Pasang Surut Jenderal yang Selalu Terpinggirkan ”  [ archive ] , Kompas  (in) , (accessed November 4, 2006 )
  17. ↑ ( id ) ” Sejarah Jenderal Beroposisi ”  [ archive ] , Detik, (accessed November 4, 2006 )
  18. ↑ ( id ) ” Nasution Meets Suharto Again ”  [ archive ] ,(accessed November 4, 2006 )